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PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES AND REORGANIZATION
REFORM
THE ACTIVITIES of protective committees in corporate reorganization have
provoked recurring criticism and sporadic reform. Equity receivership re-
organizations were frequently characterized by the failure of protective and
reorganization committees to perform their theoretical function of negotiating
a reorganization plan insuring the maximum return to their dependent
constituents. This circumstance was principally attributable to the subser-
vience of the committees representing the various claimants to banker or
management groups, or a combination of the two, whose chief concern was
the perpetuation of profitable business associations, the preservation of a
particular class of claims in which they were pecuniarily interested, or the
whitewashing of past irregularities to save prestige or to avoid legal liability.2
Where so inclined, "inside" groups normally found it a relatively easy
matter to consummate a reorganization to serve their own purposes. Since
1. See Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Comnittfee in Bondholders' Reorgania-
tions (1929) 42 H1Av. L. REv. 899, 907.
2. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON PRoT£crIE & Ron-
GAizATioN CoMMITTEEs (1936-7) PARTS I, II, & III, H. R. Report No. 35 (Sabath
Committee) Part 2, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
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they could generally control the conduct of indenture trustees,3 who even on
default could be compelled to act only in the unlikely event of a demand by a
substantial percentage of security-holders, 4 "insiders" were usually able to
institute consent receivership proceedings at their own convenience. They
were thereby enabled to choose the most favorable jurisdiction and to secure
the appointment of a friendly receiver0 who would not interfere with their
program. By virtue of advance knowledge of the debtor's affairs and prac-
tically exclusive possession of the indispensable bondholders lists,8 hand-
picked "inside" protective committees generally could present to investors a
distorted version of the situation long before anyone else could provide a
more accurate picture.9 Uninformed and -helpless, the great majority of se-
curity-holders generally deposited their claims with such committees under
agreements which bound depositors to any plan their representatives might
adopt 0 unless onerous terms of withdrawal were followed.1 1 Since most
courts literally enforced these agreements, 12 independent committees, initially
handicapped, found it almost impossible subsequently to gain support. Bank-
er-management cqmmittees consequently were generally able to confront the
court with a plan previously accepted by a great majority of investors."3 And
although plans prepared under such conditions called for careful scrutiny,
the courts, influenced by practical considerations, as a rule readily sustained
the fairness of any proposal thus crystallized,' 4 and often manifested a ten-
dency to place technical procedural obstacles in the paths of objectors.",
3. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part VI, at 71 et seq., PART I, at 872; Posner,
The Trustee and the Trust Indenture: A Further Study (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 737,
790; Moore and Levi, Federal Intcr'ention I. The Right to Inter'ene and Reorrqaniza-
tion (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 565, 603.
4. Posner, supra note 3, at 763.
5. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, PART I, at 872.
6. Id. at 869.
7. Id. at 876.
8. See Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 905, 906; S. E. C., op. cit. snpra note 2,
PART I, at 877. Motions to compel insiders to disclose their lists met with occasional
success in New York. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 498. But even where suc-
cessful the petitioning parties generally acquired them at too late a stage in the pro-
ceeding to be greatly benefitted. Id. at 504. In In re International Match Corporation a
federal court denied such a motion on the ground that the court should remain neutral
where two rival committees were competing for deposits. 59 F. (2d) 1012 (S. D. N. Y.
1932), (1933) 42 YALE L, J. 984.
9. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 498, 504; (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 984, 985.
10. See 2 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) § 1005; (1933) 42 YALE L. J.
984.
11. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 888 et seq.
12. See Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 670, 678;
(1937) 32 ILL L. REv. 359.
13. See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorgan-
ization (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 541, 568.
14. See Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923,
929.
15. See Moore and Levi, supra note 3, at 600 et seq.
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In addition to the inducement of control, the opportunities that a reorgani-
zation afforded for lucrative emoluments in the form of fees and patron-
age were also a powerful incentive for a protective committee sponsorship
by inside as well as other groups. 1G Despite their theoretical fiduciary capac-
ity,' 7 committees framed oppressive deposit agreements endowing themselves
with virtually unlimited discretion, including the right to fix their own com-
pensation and that of their personally selected agents, and to pledge or other-
wise dispose of deposited securities.' 8 And committees often took advantage
of their familiarity with the probable course of a reorganization to trade in
defaulted securities against uninformed investors1 9
While these abuses contributed somewhat to the movement for legislative
reform of reorganization machinery,20 Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act'
was enacted primarily in response to the demands of those who felt that
reorganization leadership was properly a function of the underwriters and
the management.22 From the point of view of this group, majority represen-
tatives were unduly hampered and "strikers" unwarrantedly encouraged by
the cumbersome procedural machinery of equity receiverships and by the
requirement that dissenters be paid in cash.2 Since 77B incorporated provi-
sions simplifying reorganization machinery 24 and binding minorities to plans
approved by majorities,- even where such approval preceded the commence-
ment of proceedings,2 6 it enhanced the need for regulating majority com-
16. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part I at 136 et seq., 864.
17. See (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 330, 332.
18. See Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. or P.%. L Rev. 670, 676-678;
S. . C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part I at 888 et seq.
19. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part I at 155.
20. Dodd, Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935) 43
HIv. L. Rav. 1100, 1104; see \Veiner, Corporate Reorgani:aliou: Sectiol 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act (1934) 34 COL. L. RE'. 1173, 1188.
21. 48 STAT. 911 (1934). 11 U.S.C. §207 (1934).
22. See Dodd, supra note 20, at 1110.
23. See Swaine, Corporate Reorganization Under the Federal Bankruptcy Powcer
(1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 317, 323 et seq. (suggesting elimination of mandatory receivers,
ancillary receiverships, judicial sales, and cash payments to dissenters). With regard
to "striker" activities, see Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 1303, 1317 el seq.
24. Thus the necessity of a judicial sale is eliminated. § 77B(h). The debtor itself
may file a petition and propose a plan. § 77B(a) & (dl. The court has jurisdiction over
the debtor's property wherever situated. § 77B (a). The debtor may be left in posses-
sion. §77B(c)(1).
25. § 77B (e) & (g). By tlhe-e provisions the consent of t%%o-thirds of the creditors
and of a majority of the stockholders is sufficient for the effectuation of a plan binding
upon all affected classes. And if certain conditions are complied with, a plan may be
consummated without such consent. §§77B(b)(4 & 5), 77B(e)(i). See Comment
(1936) 46 YALE L J. 119.
26. § 77B(e) (1). See Weiner, supra note 20, at 1184. Campbell v. Allegheny Corp.,
75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
1937]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
mittees and for affording independent groups the opportunity to function
effectively.27
77B attempted to protect the investor against exploitation by subjecting
protective committees to judicial supervision after their appearance in the
proceeding as representatives of the investors who had been persuaded to
accept their leadership, by neutralizing the advantages possessed by "inside"
committees, and by requiring court approval of plans. But the vital func-
tions of preparing plans and enlightening security holders as to their content
remained within the province of protective committees, and no effort was
made to prevent conflicts of interests between the committees and their con-
stituents.
With the exception of a single case where the court removed a fraudulent
obstructionist committee by resorting to its "scrutiny" power under 77B (b)-
(10) to disregard the provisions of a deposit agreement,2 8 courts have exer-
cised no direct control over committee personnel. One limited method
of control over committees whose interests conflicted with those of their
constituents did subsequently develop under the statute, when the S. E. C.
interpreted Section 77B (h) to exempt from compliance with the registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act 29 only those securities which were issued
pursuant to a confirmed plan. Hence committees contemplating the issuance
of certificates of deposit are required to register with the Commission unless
they gain exemption under Section 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Act by ob-
taining court approval of the terms of their deposit agreements in advance
of solicitation, 0 or unless the legal effect of a deposit is equivalent solely to
the bestowal of authority to accept a plan.81 But "inside" activity has not
been perceptibly hampered by the S. E. C.'s requirement that registrants
completely disclose their past affiliations and the circumstances surrounding
27. See Rohrlich, The New Deal in Corporation Law (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1167,
1181.
28. In re Schroeder Hotel Co., 86 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). The court
used the device of "disregarding" the provisions of the deposit agreement empowering
the committee to represent depositors. Cf. In re Rosenbaum Grain Co., 13 F. Supp. 600
(N. D. Ill. 1935), where the court, in response to the debtor's unique request, appointed
representatives to serve on the creditor and stockholder committees and assumed gen-
eral supervision over their work. But in In re Fox Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc., 74 F.
(2d) 722 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) a court denied a petition under § 21(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act for an examination of the "motives and intent" of an "inside" committee.
29. See S. E. C. Release No. 296 (class C) Feb. 15, 1935, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv.
13272. See Legis. (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1348. This construction has been criticized
as unwarranted by the language of the statute. See Developments in the Law-Reor-
ganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1936) 49 HAV. L. Rsv. 1111,
1158.
30. For a comprehensive discussion of this exemption in corporate reorganizations,
see Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1050.
31. S. E. C. Release, supra note 29.
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their organization.32 Many committees entirely exempt themselves from the
Securities Act by soliciting only assents or proxies.P Others which have
secured exemption by obtaining judicial approval of their deposit agreements,
have found that the courts apparently do not inspect committee personne1.d
Even where committees have registered, the value of disclosure seems doubt-
ful, for, unlike the prospective investor who may buy or not as he chooses,
the holder of defaulted securities frequently has no real choice except to
follow the leadership of an "inside" committee regardless of his opinion of
the quality of service likely to be rendered.-5
The application of the Securities Act to protective committee securities
has perhaps had a greater impact with respect to the regulation of the terms
of deposit agreements. Some committees which seek exemption by obtaining
court approval of their deposit agreements have thereby possibly been in-
duced to seek narrower powers.30 On the other hand, the practice of securing
exemption through the submission of deposit agreements for judicial approval
has probably diminished the effectiveness of the authority vested in the judge,
under the "scrutiny" clause of 77B, to restrain a committee from exercising
any power which he deems unfair or inconsistent with public policy. Since
the court hearing must necessarily precede solicitation, there is little likeli-
hood of substantial opposition,3 i and such hearings have apparently been cur-
sory ex parte proceedings at which judicial approval has followed as a matter
of course"S even though deposit agreements generally embrace the same fea-
32. For the form of statement required by the S. F_. C. in connection with the regis-
tration of certificates of deposit, see C. C. H. Fed. Sec. Act Serv. t1 6901 et seq. Regis-
tration has been denied to committees which omitted to reveal the existence of rial
plans. In the Matter of Howard, 1. S. E. C. 6, 18 F. T. C. 6_6 (1934); In the Matter of
Commonwealth Bond Corp., 1 S. E. C. 13, 18 F.T.C. 635 (1934). One court, in sus-
taining a plan. declared immaterial the failure of a committee to inform depositors of
the existence of a competing plan. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Lawton-Byrne-
Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 79 F. (2d) 804, 820 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
33. Although there has apparently been no instance as yet in which proxies have
been held to be "securities" within the meaning of the Securities Act, "it is possible
that some proxies . .. vesting substantial powers in the holder" may be so construed.
Fortas, The Securities Act and Corporate Reorganization (1937) 4 L,,w & Co,.Tmp.
PRon. 218, 222 n. 30. For an analysis of this question, see Comment (1934) 34 Cot. L
REv. 1348, 1349. Proxies or assents solicited in 77B reorganizations are also exempt
from § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, whereby the S. E. C. is vested with a
rule making power with regard to proxies relating to securities listed on national ex-
changes. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 461, Jan. 21, 1936, C. C. L Stod: Ex-
change Service, 12754.01.
34. See Fortas, supra note 33, at 230; cf. Dodd supra note 20, at 1122.
35. See Fortas, supra note 33, at 232 et seq.
36. See Spaeth and Freidberg, Early Developments under Section 77B (1935) 30
Iii. L. Rr-v. 137, 147.
37. See Comment (1935) 45 YArm L. J. 1050, 1055.
38. But cf. Matter of Paramount-Publix Corporation, No. 56763 (S. D. N. Y. Feb.
1935) (approval given to provide exemption, court reserving jurisdiction to make any
further necessary orders).
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tures as formerly.39 And once a court has approved a deposit agreement, it
probably would be reluctant to upset it subsequently under the "scrutiny"
power. Whether because of this factor or because of the traditional sanctity
of private contracts, the "scrutiny" clause is apparently not being utilized to
curtail the rigid committee control over depositors.
Thus at least two courts have countenanced clauses which imposed burden-
some conditions upon the depositor's right to withdraw, although investors
who had otherwise expressed their disapproval of a plan would thereby be
counted among those ratifying.40 There has even been a refusal to resort to
the "scrutiny" power to prevent a committee from making exploitive profits
at the expense of investors. In one case where a committee had sold deposited
securities to an apparently collusive group at a 60 percent discount after fore-
stalling a competitive bid by withholding information essential for its sub-
mission, the court unequivocally sustained the sale on the ground that the
deposit agreement authorized the committee to sell to whom it pleased. 41
Moreover, 77B's attempt to curb committee dealing in affected securities was
nullified by the court's ruling in the same case that it could not limit the
claims so purchased to the consideration paid, because Section 77B (b) (10)
authorized it to adopt such a course only with regard to claims filed by com-
mittees. At least one other court reached an identical conclusion with respect
to claims filed by a corporation which had acquired them from investors with
the aid of a committee.42 Courts have for the most part invoked the "scrut-
iny" clause to disregard stipulations permitting committees to determine their
own or their agents' compensation. 43 But with respect to this matter the courts
are expressly instructed by the statute to make an independent judgment.4
39. See In re Saenger Theatres, Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1111 2328.01-02, 3081
(E. D. La. 1935); Fortas, supra note 33, at 228, 237.
40. In re Witherbee Court Corporation, 88 F. (2d) 251 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert.
den. sub. non. Klee Corp. v. Roosevelt, 57 Sup. Ct. 931 (1937), rehearing denied, 57
Sup. Ct. 937 (1937), (1937) 32 ILr. L. Rav. 259; see Jamieson v. Walters, 91 F. (2d) 61,
65 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ; cf. In re Follansbee Bros. Co., 19 F. Supp. 27 (W. D. Pa. 1937).
41. Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Rindge Land and Navig. Co.,
85 F. (2d) 557 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936), rehearing denied, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. V14242,
(1937) 50 H~av. L. REv. 525, (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 319.
42. In re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1935) ; S. E. C., op. cit. jupra note 2,
Part I at 99 et seq.
43. In re McCrory Stores Corp., 91 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); In re Spruce
Apartments, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 114346 (E. D. Pa. 1936); In re Republic Gas Corp.,
C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 13721 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). In another case where the court dis-
regarded a committee's authority and refused to permit it to release tort claims against
the mortgage trustee, the court was in reality acting pursuant to its duty to examine
the fairness of a reorganization plan under § 77B (f). In re 1775 Broadway Corp., 79 F.
(2d) 108 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
44. Under § 77B(c) (9) the court "may allow" specified parties to the proceeding,
including committees, ". . . reasonable compensation for services rendered and reim-
bursement for . . . necessary expenses incurred"; by § 77B (b) (5), the court must pass
[Vol. 47: 229
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Section 77B -has probably reduced reorganization costs, although it is im-
possible accurately to gauge the extent and effect of the practice of boosting
petitions in anticipation of subsequent reduction. Requested allowances have
invariably been cut down,45 and on at least two occasions courts have refused
any allowances to committees guilty of trading in the securities they repre-
sented.4 6 In determining whether an allowance from the debtor's estate should
be granted, courts have generally been guided by the contribution of the claim-
ant to the debtor's estate or to the plan adopted.4' Some courts have expressed
the view that compensation should be denied to persons who undertake to
act in behalf of a class of security holders already "adequately" represented.4s
Application of such standards may reduce reorganization expenses only at
the cost of discouraging independent participation. Compensation from the
estate may be denied to parties whose activities consisted of an unsuccessful
endeavor to procure the adoption of an alternative plan, or whose services
were of value with regard to the rejection of an "unfair" plan or portion
thereof, or to intervenors whose efforts induced greater circumspection on
the part of the proponents of the successful plan.40 That this is a real danger
becomes clearer when it is considered that ordinarily independent committees
are more dependent than inside committees on allowances. For to compete
on more equal terms with their opponents, independents generally solicit
proxies because they are more easily obtainable, whereas insiders are able
on the reasonableness of compensation payable from outside sources. See In. re Republic
Gas. Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 13721 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). See generally IMedill,
Fees and Expenses in a Corporate Reorganication under 77B (1936) 34 Micu. L Rtv.
331; Dezelopments in the Law-Reorgani:ation, Under Section 77B of the Banhruptcy
Act (1936) 49 HAmv. L. Rzv. 1111, 1199; Comment (1936) 3 U. op Cur. L REv. 476.
45. See Medill, supra note 44, at 349; Comment (1936) 3 U. or Cm. L REV. 476,
483, n. 39.
46. In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823, 828 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); In re
Republic Gas Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 14104 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
47. In re National Lock Co., 82 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Straus v. Baker
Co., 87 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); In re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp.,
13 F. Supp. 473 (N. D. II. 1936); In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S. D.
N. Y. 1935); In re 2747 Milwaukee Avenue Building Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Srv.
13728 (N. D. Ill. 1935); In re Willsea Work, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 114051 (NV. D.
N. J. 1936). See Medill, supra note 44, at 346, 348 n. 69, 364; Developntnits in the
Law-Reorganication Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1936) 49 HARV. L
REv. 1111, 1200; Comment (1936) 3 U. or Cur. L. REv. 476, 480.
48. See Straus v. Baker, 87 F. (2d) 401, 407 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ; In re Paramount-
Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823, 827 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
49. See, e.g., In re Nine North Church Street, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. t 4534 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1937) ; In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823, 828 (S. D. N. Y. 1936);
In re Sefton National Fibre Can Co., 13 F. Supp. 83 (E. D. Mo. 1935); In re Memphis
St. Ry. Co., 11 F. Supp. 682, 685 (D. Tenn. 1935). See also, Hearing before Conmiltee
on Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and reported as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) 186.
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to solicit deposits50 on which a lien may be enforced51 for services held not
compensable from the debtor's estate.52
And ineffective in encouraging independent participation has been Section
77B (c) (4), which authorizes the court in its discretion to require the debtor
or the trustee, if one is appointed, to prepare security-holder lists for inspec-
tion by any creditor or stockholder. Even though the production of such
lists is ordered, the independents will generally obtain them only after they
have already been used by "insiders.1 53 But however valuable this power
may be to independents in proceedings involving small corporations, it is of
little use where the proceeding involves a large corporation with a substantial
number of bearer securities or indeed any securities other than stock.04 In
such cases the only comprehensive lists are frequently in the possession of
the indenture trustee, underwriter or paying agent,", who will ordinarily sup-
ply them solely to banker-management committeesY51 The failure of the
statute to vest the judge with a broader jurisdiction over lists would thus seem
to leave practically unimpaired the advantages possessed by "insiders." Al-
though one court5 7 in a proceeding under Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act
attempted to overcome this deficiency by directing a protective committee to
disclose its lists in an order issued under Section 21(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, a 77B court subsequently stated that the purpose of this section was to
aid in collecting assets.58 The 74 court's action in compelling the committee
to disclose its lists could conceivably be justified, however, on the basis of
the power.vested in the courts under Section 2 (15)0 9 to make all orders
necessary for the enforcement of the Bankruptcy Act. But its efficacy seems
doubtful, for lists of the parties to be circularized submitted to the S. E. C.
by committee registrants have apparently been incomplete.00 Moreover,
50. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part I at 883 et seq.
51. See In re Spruce Apartments, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. % 4346 (E. D. Pa. 1936);
In re Milwaukee Lodge No. 46, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 3981 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
52. See In re Memphis Street Railway, 11 F. Supp. 682 (W. D. Tenn. 1935). The
failure of a reorganization has on at least two occasions been cited as a ground for
refusing compensation to creditors' representatives. In re Manhattan Music Hall, 14 F.
Supp. 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); In re W. N. Britton Realty Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv.
1[ 4357 (W. D. N.Y. 1936). But ef. In re Green Mountain Syrup Corp., C. C. H. Bankr.
Serv. 1 4238 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
53. See Campbell v. Allegheny Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (assents
solicited for voluntary recapitalization used in 77B) ; O'Connor v. Mills, C. C. H. Banlcr.
Serv. 4706 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Spaeth & Friedberg, supra note 36, at 145.
54. See 2 GERDEs, CoRPoRATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) 1595.
55. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part I, at 877.
56. Ibid.
57. In re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) (subpoena duces tecum).
58. In re Fox Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc., 74 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935),
(1936) 30 ILT. L. Rxv. 89.
59. Cf. O'Connor v. Mills, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 11 4706 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
60. See Fortas, supra note 33, at 232.
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since the statute permits only plans previously accepted by a substantial
number of investors to be formally submitted to the court,61 the limited juris-
diction over lists appears particularly inadequate to stimulate the presentation
of plans by independents.6 2
Hopes of curbing selfish "inside" dictatorship of reorganization proceed-
ings were founded chiefly 3 on the clauses directing the court to conduct hear-
ings for the consideration of all proposed plans0 4 and to confirm only such
plans as, after an additional hearing, it found fair, equitable and feasible. 3
But 77B courts are seldom in a position to form an intelligent judgment on a
reorganization plan, for they are infrequently equipped with the necessary
grasp of the financial condition, potential assets, and business prospects of the
enterprise, and the past conduct of its management.00 Understanding of a
complex business organization can be acquired only through the medimn of
an objective investigation.6" The statute, however, does not provide the judge
with an independent fact-finding agency. 08 And the court's power to require
the debtor or trustee to submit information necessary "to disclose the con-
duct of the debtor's affairs and the fairness of any proposed plan"69 is of
little moment, for debtors "commonly have been left in possession '7 and
friendly trustees frequently appointed.-' Since such parties obviously cannot
be relied upon to furnish unbiased recitals of the pertinent facts, particularly
with reference to the debtor's past history,72 the judge has been altogether
61. § 77B d). This section imposes no such requirement on the debtor.
62. See Hearing before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and
reported as H. R- 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 170; Dodd, sutra note 20, at
1116-1117.
63. See Foster, supra note 14, at 925.
64. § 77B(d).
65. § 77B(f).
66. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 79
F. (2d) 804, 815 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Spaeth & Friedberg, supra note 36, at 177.
67. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part I at 309 el seq.
68. At least one court has commented on the absence of such an agency. See In re
Peyton Realty Co., 18 F. Supp. 822, 823 (E. D. Pa. 1936).
69. § 77B(c) (4).
70. See statement of S. F_. C. Chairman Douglas in Hearing before Committee an
Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and reported as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) 172. See, also, id. at 177.
71. See, e.g., fi re Kings Brewery, Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. U 3116 (E. D. N. Y.
1934); In re Hotel Martin Co. of Utica, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. t13938 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936). The Supreme Court has denounced this practice. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S.
36, 55 (1927).
72. See Dodd, supra note 20, at 1114. In In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., C. C.
H. Bankr. Serv. 4646 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), where the debtor was left in possession, the
court appointed a "special investigator" to examine into mismanagement claims. In the
Standard Gas and Electric Co. reorganization Judge Nields has appointed a special
trustee to litigate a $100,000,000 mismanagement suit upon the recommendation of the
special masters. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1937, p. 35, col. 6.
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dependent upon the statements of interested parties.7 And since the statute
tends to discriminate against the proposal of plans by independent parties,
courts may often be deprived of the enlightenment they might otherwise have
derived from a comparative analysis of alternate plans. 4 The supervisory
power is also deficient in another respect. Since the hearing for confirmation
occurs only after the requisite investor support is garnered, the judge is not
relieved from the pressure of disrupting virtually consummated proceedings. 0
Though ordinarily less qualified than the judge to assess the validity of the
statements of the parties dominating a proceeding, investors are equally de-
pendent on such statements. Indeed, the context and tenor of committee
solicitations and circulars may unduly delay or thwart entirely the consum-
mation of any plan, especially where the field is divided between rival groups,
each of which is bombarding investors with an assortment of conflicting dec-
larations. A few courts, even in the absence of statutory sanction, have en-
deavored in such cases to protect investors by prescribing or inspecting the
contents of committee circulars, or by enjoining communications likely to
affect adversely the interests of investors,76 or by presiding over conferences
attended by the various groups in an effort to reconcile their differences. 77
But these cases serve mainly to throw into bold relief the complete failure of
77B to provide any assurance that the parties ultimately supposed to decide
the terms of a reorganization will be equipped with the basis for an intelli-
gent judgment.
As a result of the failure of 77B adequately to safeguard the interests of
investors, remedial legislation, sponsored chiefly by the S. E. C., was pre-
sented to the last session of Congress in the form of three separate, but com-
plementary measures: the Lea Bill to amend the Securities Act,71 which will
be considered only as it relates to bankruptcy reorganizations, Chapter X of
the Chandler Bill to amend the Bankruptcy Act,7 9 and the Trust Indenture
or Barkley Bill,80 which is beyond the scope of this Comment.
73. See In re Rosenbaum Grain Co., 13 F. Supp. 600, 601 (N. D. Ill. 1935).
74. Dodd, supra note 20, at 1117.
75. See In re New Rochelle Coal and Lumber Co., 77 F. (2d) 881, 883 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935); Downtown Investment Association v. Boston Metropolitan Buildings, 81 F.
(2d) 314, 321 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936); In re Peyton Realty Co., 18 F. Supp. 822, 824
(E. D. Pa. 1936) ; Spaeth & Freidberg, supra; note 36, at 155; Comment (1936) 31 IL.
L. REv. 505, 519, 525; Hearing before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintro-
duced and reported as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 183. The problem is intensified
by 77B (e) (1), which recognizes assents garnered in advance of the proceeding; for
debtors have thus been enabled to utilize assents obtained in an unsuccessful attempt
to effectuate a voluntary reorganization. See Campbell v. Allegheny Corp., 75 F. (2d)
947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part I at 323 et seq.
76. See cases collectedin (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1391.
77. See Hearing before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and
reported as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 342. But cf. Texas Hotel Securi-
ties Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
78. H. R. 6968, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
79. H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
80. S. 2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
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The Chandler and Lea Bills attempt to remedy the deficiencies of 77B by
encouraging activity on the part of independent groups; by terminating "in-
side" dictatorship of reorganization proceedings; and by providing indepen-
dent agencies to supervise the formulation of reorganization plans and to
provide investors and courts with the basis for an intelligent judgment as to
the merits of proposed plans.
The Chandler Bill's effort to stimulate independent participation is framed
in light of the difficulties encountered by independents under 77B. The Bill
seeks to strengthen judicial jurisdiction over security holders' lists by making
the filing of lists mandatory 8' and by directing the judge to order any person
possessed of information necessary for this purpose to supply it.82 Similarly
the policy of the Chandler Bill with respect to compensation and reimburse-
ment from the debtor's estate is primarily designed to overcome the discour-
aging effect on independent participation of the criterion in general use under
77B. Allowances would be made from the debtor's estate to committees for
services rendered and costs properly incurred either in connection with the
administration of the estate or in connection with the submission of any plan
"approved" by the court, whether or not ultimately accepted or confirmed. 3
Freer participation would also be encouraged by the specific direction to
allow similar payments to creditors and stockholders whose services contrib-
uted to a confirmed plan, or to the refusal to confirm a plan, or were beneficial
in the administration of the estate.84
These proposed amendments merely carry somewhat further theories of
reform embodied in 77B; but the provisions of the Lea Bill go beyond the
disclosure theory of the Securities Act. By the terms of the Lea Bill any
committee or person who wishes to solicit any authorization endowing it
with discretionary power,8 5 whether in the form of proxy or deposit, would
be required to file a declaration with the S. E. C. revealing all facts deemed
relevant by the S. E. C. for the protection of investors or appropriate in the
public interest.86 A declaration would not become effective to permit solici-
tation if a committee were formed by the management or underwriter, or their
representatives, or any other parties whose interests were likely to conflict with
existing or prospective constituents.87 Authorization agreements would have
to be framed to include provisions insuring the adherence of those acting in
81. Chandler Bill, c. X, art. VII, § 164.
82. § 165.
83. § 242(1). For the definition of an "approved" plan under the Chandler Bill, see
p. 241 infra.
84. § 243.
85. Lea Bill, § 303 (14) (15).
86. §305(a)(1), 306(a). The registration requirements of the Securities Act
would not apply to "any solicitation as to which a declaration was effective; or any
transaction in any security evidencing the deposit of a security pursuant to" such a
solicitation. § 305(b). A prospectus would have to precede or accompany a solicita-
tion. §305(a) (2).
87. §§307(a), 308(3), (4), (5) & (6), 311 (a) (5) (B), 311 (b) (1).
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a representative capacity to a high fiduciary standard.8 8 Finally the permissible
purposes for which deposits could be solicited would be limited to those which
are necessary under the plan or essential to enable the solicitor to sue or make
collections on behalf of investors.8 9
But since the Chandler Bill provides for independent agencies to perform
the principal functions currently fulfilled by protective committees, there
would probably be little occasion for the invocation of the Lea Bill's sanc-
tions. The reorganization system incorporated in the Chandler Bill would
inhibit the present ability of "inside" groups to capitalize on both courts' and
investors' lack of information and so push through a reorganization plan. 0
Under the Chandler Bill the court would be required to appoint a disinter-
ested trustee for all debtors with a scheduled indebtedness exceeding
$250,000."1 After a thorough investigation of the debtor's property, financial
condition, possible causes of action, irregularities in past management, and
the desirability of continued operation, the trustee would submit a compre-
hensive report of his findings to the judge . 2 Subsequently he would be
required, in such form as the judge prescribed, to dispatch to all creditors,
stockholders, indenture trustees and the S. E. C., a brief statement of his
findings, 93 and to creditors and stockholders a notification that they may pre-
sent suggestions for plans to him.9 4 For these purposes he would have at his
disposal all essential lists.9 5 After consulting with such parties it would be the
trustee's duty, within a time fixed by the judge, to present a plan, or the
reasons why he could not effect one. 8 At the hearing on this plan the debtor,
creditors, or stockholders might offer objections thereto or submit alterna-
tive proposals.97 Where the corporation's liabilities exceeded $3,000,000 the
judge would be obliged to forward any plans he deemed "worthy of consid-
eration" to the S. E. C., for advisory reports thereon within a time fixed by
himself; and in other cases might do so at his option.08 In all cases, however,
the S. E. C. would be given notice of all steps in the proceedings, 0 and would
be a party in interest entitled to intervene as to all matters upon the filing of
88. §311(a) (1)-(4).
89. § 311(a) (6).
90. See H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1937) 38.
91. Chandler Bill, § 156.
92. § 167, (1) & (3).
93. §167 (5).




98. § 172. By § lf of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, however, [49 STAT.
803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1936)] the approval of the S. E. C. would be neces-
sary for a plan to become effective in any case involving a registered holding com-




a notice of appearance. 0 After receiving the Commission's report or, where
no plan had been submitted to the Commission, after the aforementioned hear-
ing, the court would fix a time for the acceptance of those plans it approves
as "fair, equitable, and feasible."'' Plans so approved and summaries there-
of, the judge's opinion, and the S. E. C. report would then be sent by the
trustee to all affected creditors and stockholders. 10 2 Prior to this time all
parties would be forbidden to solicit acceptance or authorities to accept, and
solicitation thereafter would be permitted only in connection with approved
plans.103
After the requisite investor majorities have approved, 0 4 the judge, as
under 77B, is to confirm a plan if inter alia it is "fair, equitable and feasi-
ble."'10 Before bestowing his approval, however, he is specifically directed to
examine the qualifications of the reorganized corporation's management with
respect to its appropriateness for the protection of investors or for the public
interest. 08 If a debtor whose liabilities did not exceed $250,000 were left in
possession, 0 7 the court might appoint a disinterested "examiner" with any or
all of the trustee's powers and duties regarding investigations and the formula-
tion of plans. 08 If no such appointment were made, the procedure would
differ only in that plans might originally be proposed at a court hearing by
the debtor or any creditor or stockholder. 00
The enactment of the proposed legislation would doubtless strongly deter





104. §§ 77B (b) (4) & (5) which set forth the manner in which non-assenting classes
may be bound are also retained. § 216 (7) & (8). In this connection, see Comment
(1936) 46 YAi. L. J. 116. But whereas under § 77B (e) (4) all "affected" allowed
claims were included for the purpose of determining the requisite majorities, under the
Chandler Bill, only claims filed by the holders thereof would be counted. § 193. Hence
claims filed by indenture trustees on behalf of their "cestuis,' as allowed by the same
section, would not be included for the purpose of determining the requisite majorities.
Moreover, if an acceptance or failure to accept were not in good faith, the judge, after
a hearing, would have the discretionary power of disqualifying such "claim or stock
. . ." for the purpose of determining the requisite majority for the acceptance of a
plan. §203; §221(3). In Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. 11aco Deeflopment Co.
[87 F. (2d) 395 (C.C. A. 5th, 1936)], it was held that claims purchased for the spe-
cific purpose of obtaining a veto over plans could not be denied' the voting privilege
under §77B(f)(6), which states that before confirming a plan the judge shall be
satisfied that the offer of a plan and its acceptance are in good faith.
105. § 178; § 221 (1)-(4).
106. § 221 (5).
107. The appointment of a trustee is discretionary in such cases. § 156. Where the
debtor is retained the court may at any time replace it with a trustee or may similarly
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ceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. The mechanism proposed by the Chand-
ler Bill for the promulgation of plans would largely extinguish one of the
most powerful incentives for their formation, the possibility that the dominant
committee or its sponsors could dictate the adoption of a self-serving plan." 0
The principal remaining motives for the formation of committees would be
eliminated by the provisions of the Chandler Bill precluding a committee from
acquiring -the power to bind its constituents during the negotiation of a plan
or to fix its own or its agents' compensation."' There would thus be almost
no valuable discretion which a committee would be able to obtain. Hence the
Lea Bill would infrequently be called into play, for it applies only to authori-
ties involving the exercise of discretion. The Lea Bill, however, does not
apply to solicitations of simple consents to a plan or of authorities to accept
a plan. Committees might thus still be formed to solicit assents for this pur-
pose, especially when more than one plan was submitted to investors,11 2 or
for the purpose of soliciting authorizations simply to propose a specified
plan. 13 The Lea Bill also exempts solicitations for the purpose of enabling
twenty-five or fewer security holders to act jointly.114 Despite the sweeping
character of the Chandler Bill's restriction on the solicitation of assents, this
type of committee might prove popular, for it is designed to facilitate the co-
operation of large investors, who would probably be able to work on the basis
of tacit understanding rather than formal agreement."- Committees exempt
110. Despite the destruction of this possibility it is at least questionable whether the
enactment of the proposed system would induce a substantial revival of the equity re-
organization or increased use of the voluntary reorganization, for receivership reorgan-
izers, in addition to being faced with equity's disadvantages, [see p. 231 supra] would
be subject to the sanctions of the Lea Bill. And not only would voluntary reorganizers
be unable to bind dissenters but they would have to conform, even with respect to the
solicitation of assents, to only slightly milder requirements of the Lea Bill, and would
be restrained by the Bill from utilizing assents to a voluntary plan in a subsequent judi-
cial reorganization.
111. §§242, 243 (1) (court to determine allowances from the debtor's estate),
§ 221 (4) (court to pass on reasonableness, remuneration from other sources).
112. Such solicitations presumably would not involve the exercise of discretion sub-
jecting them to the Lea Bill, which does, however, apply to the solicitation of assents
in voluntary reorganizations. § 303 (13). But in any case involving a public utility
holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, [49 STAT.
803, 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1936)] or a subsidiary thereof, the solicitation of assents
would have to be conducted in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Commis-
sion pursuant to § 11 (g) of that statute. The Commission in such cases requires the
filing of a declaration similar to that which the Lea Bill prescribes. S. E. C. Regula-
tions 12E-3(d), 4 & 5, C. C. H. Securities Serv. 1 8402B(d), C & D.
113. Cf. S. E. C. regulation 12E-3 (c), C. C. H. Securities Serv. V 8402B(c) (prom-
ulgated pursuant to § 11 (g) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act).
114. §304(a)(11).
115. Similarly exempt from § 77p of the Bankruptcy Act, such committees have fre-
quently appeared in railroad reorganizations. See Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 247,
257. Section 77, however, contains no proscriptions concerning the time of the solicita-
tion of assents within such groups.
PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE REFORI
from the Lea Bill, however, would not be entirely unsupervised.1 10 Thus,
under the Chandler Bill, any person undertaking to represent twelve or more
investors would be required to file with the court a statement disclosing the
terms of its authorization agreement, the circumstances which prompted its
participation, the amounts of claims or stock it ovned when it commenced
operation together with the cost and date at which acquired, and any dealings
therein subsequent to its employment. It would also be necessary to set forth
the amount of the securities represented and either an averment that the hold-
ers thereof acquired them at least one year before the filing of the petition
or a statement of the times of acquisition."? And any person guilty of trad-
ing in securities affected by the reorganization would be ineligible for an
allowance from the estate." 8
While protective committees would thus probably be largely eliminated as
the controlling agency in the negotiation of plans, their traditional sponsors
would in all likelihood continue to have an effective voice in the negotiation
process. Since it is improbable that committees will be formed which
would be affected by the Lea Bill, banker-management groups would be able
to participate in reorganizations on substantially equal terms with all other
parties. Stimulus for active participation on their part would not be lacking.
Many banker or management groups would likely be motivated by a sincere
sense of responsibility to investors or by a desire to retain their good will. n °
Others would primarily be actuated by more concrete considerations. They
would frequently possess personal investments in the debtor which they would
be anxious to protect and generally would be eager to absolve themselves of
responsibility for the debtor's collapse or to preserve profitable affiliations
with the reorganized venture. And in view of their prestige and familiarity
with the enterprise, they would probably exercise an influential voice in the
informal bargaining process over which the trustee is expected to preside.1'
Since "inside" knowledge of the debtor's affairs would likely be available,
there appears to be no reason to question the efficacy of the proposed mechan-
ism as a medium for the preparation of plans by adequately informed parties.




119. See, e.g., Hearing before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintro-
duced and reported as H. R. 8046) 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 234 et seq. (statement
of Alfred N. Hueston, representing bankruptcy committee, Bar Ass'n, City of N. Y.) ;
Hearing before Comnmnittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 69~63, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 153 et seq. (statement of John A. Prescott representing Invest-
ment Bankers Ass'n).
120. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 44. Even in the unusual situa-
tion where "insiders" could not meet the security ownership with respect to the submis-
sion of plans to the trustee, they might still utilize the debtor's privilege to present a
plan. Chandler Bill, §§ 169, 170 (1).
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After his investigation, the trustee would generally be equipped with a com-
petent grasp of all relevant information. Nor would the interests of invest-
ors be left completely in the hands of self-seeking "insiders" or of a trustee
with only a recent acquaintance with the debtor's problems. Large investors,
particularly institutions, would certainly be vigilant to press their claims at
the trustee's conferences, 12 t and thus would protect the interests of other
security holders of the same class. Should the Barkley Bill be passed, inden-
ture trustees, undiverted by interests adverse to those of their "cestuis,"1 22
would be obligated to protect the claims of the latter.123 Moreover, the S. E.
C. would be empowered to intervene generally as a party in interest, and
would therefore presumably in appropriate cases be able to participate in the
negotiation of plans on behalf of parties otherwise unrepresented.1
24
A question may be raised, however, as to whether the system is adapted
to the reasonably expeditious consummation of reorganization proceedings.
Perhaps as a result of the delay engendered by the I. C. C.'s failure to rec-
ognize that plans handed to investors from "above" would be unlikely to gain
the requisite investor support,'125 the Chandler Bill contemplates the formula-
tion of plans through the medium of an informal bargaining process.120 The
theory apparently is that this would facilitate the procurement of investor con-
sent by producing a compromise measure which the negotiating parties would
regard as their own handiwork. But the proscription of the solicitation of as-
sents until the judge has approved a plan raises doubts concerning the compat-
ability of the suggested machinery with a true bargaining process. It may prove
troublesome for the opposing parties to strike a bargain where many of them
would be incapable of promising definite investor support in return for con-
cessions by the other side.1 27 And even if an agreement were arrived at under
such circumstances, difficulty might subsequently be encountered in mar-
shalling the requisite number of assents to support it.' 2 8 If, therefore, some
system could be devised which would enable qualified parties to bind those
they represent without opening the gates to "inside" domination, it might be
advisable to revise the Bill accordingly.1 29
121. See DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3rd rev. ed. 1934) 1108;
Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 247, 257.
122. Barkley Bill, § 7 (b).
123. Barkley Bill, § 7(h). Even the direct participation of small investors might b6
encouraged by the Chandler Bill's requirement that the petition be filed at the debtor's
principal place of business. C. X, art. IV, § 128.
124. See Hearing before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and
reported as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 179.
125. See Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 247, 257.
126. See H. R. Rep. No. 7409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 44.
127. See Foster, Book Review (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 352, 357.
128. Ibid.
129. For a discussion of the various alternatives see, Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. 3.
247, 258 et seq.
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Endowing the S. E. C. with the power "to review" reorganization plans
might in some cases delay still further proceedings which are probably des-
tined in any event to be extremely protracted.1 30 Despite the "advisory" desig-
nation of the Commission's report, many judges would be reluctant to assume
the responsibility of approving a plan encountering the disapproval of the
S. E. C., and, regardless of the judge's conclusion, an adverse report by the
Commission might well dissuade the acceptance of a sufficiently large number
of investors to block the consummation of a plan. The S. E. C. might be
inclined to the viewpoint of a technician concerned with the promulgation of
a plan embracing the capital structure most likely to insure the successful
future operation of the corporation, and thereby protecting future as well
as past investors. Should it adopt this point of view, the Commission might
well persuade the judge to withhold his approval from a more speculative
plan which holds forth the possibility of a greater return to past investors
and which would on that account be more acceptable to security-holders al-
ready disappointed in their investment. Such an outcome, however salutory,
besides involving the hazard of protracting a reorganization, appears to be
inconsistent with the ideology of a system based on the premise that the plan
adopted shall be the one most satisfactory to the real parties in interest. But
S. E. C. participation in the negotiation process would decrease the
danger of its failing to recognize the practical need of framing a plan in the
light of the necessity of securing investor consent.131
Perhaps the most vulnerable feature of the proposed system lies in its
dependence on the disinterested trustee, who would be charged with the three-
fold duty. of investigating the past history of the debtor, operating it as a
going concern pending the reorganization, and guiding the formulation of
the reorganization plan. Disqualified from service in this capacity would be
all persons who had underwritten any of the debtor's securities within five
years preceding the filing of the petition, or who were, or within two years
130. Thus where the debtor's liabilities exceed $3,000,000, the necessary successive
steps would include a hearing on the trustee's qualifications, the trustees investigation
and his conferences concerning the plan, a hearing on the trustee's plan, an examination
thereof, and possibly of other plans, by the S. E. C., the solicitation of acceptances, and
the final hearing on the confirmation of a plan. See Hearings before Commeilte on Judi-
ciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and reported as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1937) 281, 287, 322.
131. In examining plans under the Public Utility Holding Company Act. [see note 93
supra] the Commission has thus far manifested an appreciation of the practical prob-
lems inhering in the formulation of reorganization plans. See the commission's report
and opinion on the voluntary reorganization plan submitted by the International Paper
and Power Company. S. E. C. Releases Nos. 641, 670 (Holding Company Act), May 5,
Aug. 3, 1937; (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 289. On the 77B Plan submitted by The People's
Power & Light Co., S. E. C. Release No. 885 (Holding Co. Act) Nov. 16, 1937. Its
attitude in holding company reorganizations may be influenced, however, by a desire to
stimulate compliance with the Act. For a general discussion see Comment (1935) 45
Yzrm L. J. 468, 483.
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prior to such time had been, affiliated with the debtor or any such underwriter,
or who were directors or stockholders of the debtor, or whose interests for
any other reason materially conflicted with those of any class of security
holders.13 2 History has clearly revealed that neither the debtor nor a friendly
trustee can be depended upon to exact a full accounting from the old man-
agement and seems clearly to indicate the advisability of entrusting super-
vision over the preparation of plans to independent agencies.13 3 But while
77B in authorizing the retention of the debtor in possession unduly subordi-
nated the investigation of the debtor's past management to operation at maxi-
mum efficiency pending reorganization, 3 4 a serious question may be raised as
to whether the Chandler Bill does not swing too far in the opposite direction.
The proper fulfillment of the management function requires not only a person
of superior ability, but one equipped with a thorough grasp of the corpora-
tion's particular problems. The difficulty of finding a person so qualified out-
side of the debtor's management is apparent, and the disqualification of cred-
itors, stockholders, underwriters and attorneys still further delimits the poten-
tial sources of such parties. At the very least, the trustee should be equipped
with a comprehensive understanding of the debtor's industry. Generally,
however, such a person would be in the employment of other organizations
in the same industry; and if he were available, past or present connections
with competing firms might render inexpedient his appointment to the tem-
porary stewardship of the debtor. Indeed it might even prove troublesome
in periods of economic depression when reorganizations multiply. to procure
the services of individuals who lacked experience in the industry but were
yet endowed with the capacity and integrity to manage a sizeable business
organization more efficiently than the old management.
Should the trustee, despite his ignorance of the business, officiously under-
take to manage it, the potential prejudice to investors would seem to outweigh
any possible benefits which might accrue to them. More usually. "disinter-
ested" trustees, however capable, would decide to rely on the services of the
past management-services the statute authorizes him to retain. Where this
is the case little will have been gained by the disinterestedness requirement.
And where a single trustee is appointed, he might conceivably find that his
"investigatory" function embarrassed 'his management of the enterprise by
kindling resentment among his subordinates. Such a contingency might be
avoided by the mandatory appointment of two trustees, one to administer the
business and another to perform the investigation and "plan-formulating"
functions.13 5 If this division of duties is accompanied by a relaxation of the
132. Chandler Bill, § 158.
133. See note 72 supra; S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, Part II at 11 ct seq.; Hearing
before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and reported as H. R.
8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 343.
134. See Dodd, supra note 20, at 1114.
135. See Hearing before Comnniittee on Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and
reported as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 303 el seq. (Statement of Pro-
fessor Gerdes).
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